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I. INTRODUCTION
Immigration adjudication is more diverse than it may seem.
Scholars tend to focus on one aspect of immigration adjudication, the
decision-making process established to determine whether an
individual may be removed (deported) from the United States. But
there is a whole other function of immigration adjudication that
relatively is ignored in the legal literature. Immigration adjudicators
are also tasked with determining whether to grant immigration
benefits, such as whether to grant lawful permanent resident (green
card) status.
Both types of immigration adjudication, removal and benefits,
face major challenges. The manifestations of the crises in removal
and benefits adjudication are different. This article argues, however,
that both crises are linked to a lack of transparency in immigration
law. In the removal context, the lack of transparency stems, at least
in part, from the complexity of the law and from the negative
discretion infused into the law. In the benefits context, the lack of
transparency at least partially stems from the use of administrative
guidance to adjudicate benefits applications and from the obscurity of
the administrative appellate adjudicating body, the Administrative
Appeals Office (AAO).
This lack of transparency presents big challenges for both
removal and benefits adjudication, and once recognized, opens new
lines of inquiry. In the removal context, the lack of transparency: (1)
must be considered as a contributor to overwhelming caseloads; (2)
highlights a lack of decisional independence for immigration
adjudicators; (3) must be considered as a factor in the extreme lack of
lawyers in the system; and (4) adds to the negative mystique
surrounding immigration law. In the benefits context, the use of
administrative guidance and the obscurity of the AAO help to explain
the confusion, uncertainty and extreme lack of confidence
characteristic of the benefits adjudication system.
This article is a second step in examining the connections
between immigration law and the crisis in immigration adjudication.
A contemporaneous article more broadly explores the role of
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immigration law in problems affecting removal adjudication.' This
article focuses on how the lack of transparency is linked to removal
adjudication, as well as expands the study by examining how the lack
of transparency is linked to benefits adjudication. Badly needed
reform of both removal and benefits adjudication must consider these
links.
II. REMOVAL ADJUDICATION
A. Removal Adjudication Challenges
In a removal (deportation) case, the government charges a foreign
national with an immigration violation that may result in expulsion
from the United States. There is an administrative adjudication
system housed within the executive branch designed to determine
whether to issue a removal order. The administrative system is
comprised of immigration judges, who make up the trial level of
administrative adjudication, and the Board of Immigration Appeals,
which is the administrative body that hears appeals from immigration
judge decisions.2
There are four major challenges facing the adjudication of
removal cases at the administrative level. First, the administrative
components of the system are expected to adjudicate an astounding
number of cases per year. Second, both immigration judges and
members of the Board of Immigration Appeals lack decisional
independence. Third, there is an extreme lack of lawyers in the
system representing the interests of foreign nationals. Fourth,
immigration adjudication suffers from a lack of esteem, which both
feeds on and helps to promote a negative mystique surrounding
immigration law.
Cases are simply clogging the administrative adjudication system.
The federal government set a new record for the number of removals
I Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors
to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REv. 541 (2011).
2 There may be judicial review of the administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. §
1252. This article focuses on the administrative adjudication component.
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in Fiscal Year 2009.3 There is no indication that this trend will
reverse, especially as more state and local governments put pressure
on the federal government to increase enforcement efforts.'
Therefore, the number of cases entering the system per year likely
will increase as the executive branch seeks to remove greater
numbers of individuals each year. '
During Fiscal Year 2009, about 230 immigration judges heard
290,233 proceedings.6 In terms of workload, "proceedings" includes
only intensive hearings, and not motions or bond hearings.7 These
numbers equate to over 1200 intensive hearings per year per judge.
Both the nature of these proceedings and the existing case
backlog serve as evidence that this workload per judge is too high.
These are not high volume cases. Often, immigration judges are
called upon to make time intensive credibility determinations and to
consider thorny questions of law. For example, in an asylum case, an
immigration judge must determine if an applicant has a well-founded
fear of persecution if returned to his or her home country.8 Often
these cases are not well-documented due to the nature of the claim.
An applicant usually does not have the time or the ability to gather
I U.S. Dep't. of Homeland Security, Office of Immigr. Statistics, Immigration
Enforcement Actions: 2009 at 1 (2010) (explaining that the 2009 total marked the
seventh consecutive record high).
4 For example, if implemented, Arizona's SB 1070 would require state law
enforcement officers to determine the immigration status of many more individuals
who come into contact with the police, as well as all of those arrested. A.R.S. § I1-
1051(B). Each additional check is a potential case for the federal adjudication
system.
s In an earlier article, I raised the point, however, that more deportations do not
automatically result in more cases in the adjudication system, as the executive
branch can divert foreign nationals from the adjudication system. Jill E. Family, A
Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595
(2009).
6 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Number of Immigration
Judges, available at
http://trac.syr.edulimmigration/reports/225/include/payroll.html; U.S. Dep't. of
Justice, Executive Office for Immigr. Review, 2009 Statistical Yearbook at B7
[hereinafter "2009 Statistical Yearbook"].
7 2009 Statistical Yearbook at B7.
8 See infra notes 67 to 78.
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documentation of persecution before fleeing.' Also, adjudicating a
fear-based claim often requires detailed understanding not only of US
law, but also of international conventions.o Not surprisingly, an
extremely large backlog has developed in the immigration courts. As
of June 2010, 247,922 cases were pending before the immigration
courts, and the average wait time for a case pending in the
immigration courts was 459 days."
The Board of Immigration Appeals has a controversial history of
managing its own large caseload. In Fiscal Year 2009, the Board
completed 33,103 cases. 12  The Board is authorized to have 15
members, but currently it has 14.13 Again, these are not high volume
cases. While the Board is currently completing more cases per year
than it receives, by 2001 a backlog of 56,000 cases had developed.14
To combat the backlog, the Board implemented a controversial
procedure called "streamlining." 5  Under mandatory streamlining,
pre-scripted, two sentence opinions became the staple of the Board's
work product. To allow the Board to work faster, the streamlining
changes forbade the Board from issuing reasoned decisions in large
9 Stephen Yale-Loehr & John R.B. Palmer, Evidentiary Issues in Asylum
Cases, 6 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 595, 595 (2001).
1o For example, the U.S. Senate has ratified the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
That convention forbids a signatory state to send an individual to another state
where "there is a substantial likelihood that she would be tortured." Lori Nessel,
"Willful Blindness" to Gender-Based Violence Abroad: United States'
Implementation ofArticle III of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, 89
MINN. L. REv. 71, 74 n.9, 90-94 (2004).
" Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Immigration Case Backlog
Continues to Grow (August 12, 2010), available at
http://trac.syr.edulimmigration/reports/235/.
12 2009 Statistical Yearbook at S1.
11 U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals, available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/fs/biabios.htm.
14 Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without Opinion, Referral for
Panel Review, and Publication of Decisions as Precedents, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,654,
34,656 (June 18, 2008) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003).
11 Family, supra note 5, at 605.
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classes of cases.'" Streamlining also decimated the use of three-
member panels in favor of single member review. 1
The nature of the caseloads of both the immigration courts and
the Board raise questions about how the tremendous caseloads affect
both adjudicators and the foreign nationals who are the subject of the
proceedings. The answers to those questions are disturbing on both
fronts. Immigration judges scored higher on a workplace burnout
test than any other professional group, scoring higher (meaning
higher burnout) than prison wardens.18 As far as foreign nationals,
the federal courts of appeals have been raising serious questions
about the quality of administrative immigration adjudication.' 9 Judge
Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
wrote that administrative immigration adjudication has fallen "below
the minimum standards of legal justice." 20
Immigration judges and Board members are called on to manage
these enormous caseloads without the benefit of decisional
independence. 21 This is the second major challenge facing the
adjudication of removal cases at the administrative level.
Immigration judges and Board members do not hold the job
1 6 Id.
17 Id.
18 See Stuart L. Lustig et al., Burnout and Stress Among United States
Immigration Judges, 13 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 22 (2008).
11 See, e.g., Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2008); Ali v. Mukasey,
529 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2008); Kaita v. Attorney General, 522 F.3d 288 (3d Cir.
2008); Floroiu v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 2007).
20 Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005).
21 Professor Stephen Legomsky has identified and focused on one type of
constraint on decisional independence in the immigration adjudication context:
"the threat of personal consequences for the adjudicator" in the context of
immigration adjudication. Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on
Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 369, 389 (2006). Professor Legomsky
described:
Under this constraint, the case is presumed to be one that the law
clearly allows the adjudicator to decide, and there is no attempt by a
superior to directly dictate the outcome of that case, but there are general
threats, real or perceived, that decisions which displease an executive
official could pose professional risks for the adjudicator.
Id. Professor Legomsky has argued that decisional independence is necessary,
at a minimum, at some point in the immigration adjudication system to uphold the
rule of law. Id. at 386, 394-401, 403.
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protections of other types of administrative law judges.22 In fact,
immigration judges and Board members are mere employees of the
Department of Justice. Their boss is the Attorney General of the
United States. The entire Board exists by regulation only, and the
Attorney General is in charge of hiring, firing, training and reviewing
the immigration judge corps.23
The bureaucratic structure provides no formal protections for
these administrative decision makers. Two recent controversies drew
attention to this lack of decisional independence. These two
scenarios include signals from the top that understandably would
cause an immigration adjudicator to consider what his or her boss
might think about his or her decision-making record.
First, there is evidence that Attorney General John Ashcroft used
his power over immigration adjudication to fire ideologically-
selected members of the Board of Immigration Appeals. As a part of
the streamlining reforms mentioned above, Attorney General
Ashcroft fired members of the Board. Research revealed that those
fired held decision-making records that were more favorable to
foreign nationals.24 The message from the Attorney General made its
way to the immigration judges. The President of the National
Association of Immigration Judges explained that immigration
judges saw the Board firings as politically motivated.25 This
immigration judge called the Attorney General's actions "selective
downsizing" and noted the "chilling effect" of the firings.26
Second, the administration of George W. Bush hired new
immigration adjudicators based on their political loyalties. The U.S.
Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility and the
22 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (addressing removal of Administrative Law
Judges by the Merit System Protection Board).
23 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2009); Authorities Delegated to the Director of the
EDIR, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 53673 (Sept. 20, 2007)
(explaining that immigration judges are "Department of Justice attorneys who are
designated by the Attorney General to conduct such proceedings, and they are
subject to the Attorney General's direction and control").
24 Legomsky, supra note 21, at 376 (2006); See also Peter J. Levinson, The
Fagade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate Adjudications, 9
BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154 (2004).
25 Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an
Article I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 11 (2008).
21 d. at 11, 14.
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U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General issued a
report detailing the unlawful politicization of hiring for immigration
judge positions. 27  Immigration judges fill career civil service
positions. These are not purely political positions.29  The report
concluded that the Bush administration violated civil service laws
and departmental policy in selecting candidates for immigration
judge positions based on political ties rather than based on
professional qualifications.3 0
Compounding troubles of too-high caseloads and a lack of
decisional independence for immigration adjudicators is the third
major challenge facing immigration adjudication: a lack of quality
legal representation for foreign nationals in immigration court.
Recent statistics show that 61% of respondents in immigration court
did not have attorney representation.31 Of those detained during the
civil immigration hearing process, less than 20% appeared with an
attorney.3 2 There is no right to government funded counsel during
immigration proceedings for foreign nationals, but the government is
represented by a corps of lawyers who work either for the
Department of Homeland Security or the Department of Justice.33
There are also serious concerns about the quality of representation for
those foreign nationals who do secure representation, including
worries about poor lawyering and the unauthorized practice of
immigration law.34
The fourth major challenge is immigration law's esteem problem.
Immigration law has an esteem problem because it is sometimes
27 U.S. Dep't of Justice, An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring
by Monica Goodling and other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General (2008).28 Id. at 70.
29 Id at 11-15.
30 Id. at 69.
' 2009 Statistical Yearbook at Gl.
32 Vera Institute of Justice, Improving Efficiency and Promoting Justice in the
Immigration System, I (May 2008) available at
http://www.vera.org/download?file=1780/LOP%2BEvaluationMay2008_fmal.pdf
" See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A).
3 Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, supra
note 5, at 604.
perceived as an outlier among and inferior to other areas of law,3 5
including administrative law.36 This lack of esteem exists not
because immigration law is too easy or fails to present a challenge to
seasoned lawyers and judges.37 Rather, from an outsider perspective
looking in, the system is criticized both by identifications of
shortcomings in some immigration adjudicators and by
acknowledgement of the poor quality of legal representation that is
too often on display. 38 It is not unusual to find U.S. Court of Appeals
judges identifying biased behavior or the use of poor legal analysis
among immigration adjudicators.3 9  Circuit judges have also raised
serious concerns about poor lawyering on behalf of foreign nationals
and overzealous prosecution by government attorneys.40
31 See Leslie C. Levin, Guardians at the Gate: The Backgrounds, Career
Paths, and Professional Development of Private US Immigration Lawyers, 34 LAW
& Soc. INQUIRY 399, 400 (2009). In fact, even among immigration lawyers,
representation of individuals in removal hearings is perceived as a non-prestigious
type of immigration law practice. Id. at 412-14.
36 See Kevin R. Johnson, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons About Immigrants in the
Administrative State, 45 Hous. L. REv. 11, 18 (2008) ("[I]mmigration law-
although administered and enforced through a complex and powerful
administrative bureaucracy-is considered to be a specialty area outside the
mainstream of administrative law or U.S. law generally"); Margaret H. Taylor,
Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and
Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1647, 1653-54 (1996) (addressing an
impression "that immigration law is too specialized to be a useful field of inquiry
for those who are not tutored in its complexities").
37 See, e.g., Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) ("This case vividly
illustrates the labyrinthine character of modem immigration law-a maze of hyper-
technical statutes and regulations that engender waste, delay, and confusion for the
Government and petitioners alike.")
38 See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2005)
("This tension between judicial and administrative adjudicators is not due to
judicial hostility to the nation's immigration policies or to a misconception of the
proper standard of judicial review of administrative decisions. It is due to the fact
that the adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the
minimum standards of legal justice."). See also Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to
Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street
Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 541, 543-44, 562 (2009);
Careen Shannon, Regulating Immigration Legal Service Providers: Inadequate
Representation andNotario Fraud, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 577, 584-86 (2009).
3 See cases cited supra note 19.
40 Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the
Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 3, 10 (2008) (explaining that "too many
53Spring 2011 Murky Immigration Law
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Additionally, the esteem problem is founded in immigration law's
status as an isolated, over-complicated area of law where usual legal
conventions do not apply. 41
The state of removal adjudication is unsatisfactory. Adjudicators
are worn out trying to keep up with unmanageable caseloads. The
bureaucratic placement of immigration adjudicators raises serious
concerns about their dependence on politically appointed law
enforcement officials. The great majority of foreign nationals
working their way through this system have no attorney assistance to
guide them. Perhaps not surprisingly, the entire adjudication system
is not admired.
B. A Lack of Transparency: The Complexity oflmmigration Law and
the Role ofNegative Discretion
This section will explore connections between the four main
challenges facing the removal adjudication system discussed above-
too high caseloads, a lack of decisional independence, a lack of
lawyers for foreign nationals, and the esteem problem-to a lack of
transparency in immigration law. While these connections may not
explain all of the system's troubles, these connections do provide a
new perspective on the crisis. The opacity of immigration law in this
context is exemplified by its extremely complex nature and by the
role of negative discretion. Both of these characteristics, complexity
of the briefs that I see are barely competent, often boilerplate submissions"); Kang
v. Attorney General, 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (admonishing the
Government's appeal by stating that "[iut is disappointing, even shocking, that the
government fails to acknowledge that the evidence . .. compels the conclusion that
[the applicant] will likely be tortured," as well as by reminding the government that
"it is duty-bound to 'cut square corners' and seek justice rather than victory.").
41 See Stacy Caplow, ReNorming Immigration Court, 13 NEXUS 85, 94-95
(2008) (discussing the lack of rules of evidence in immigration adjudication);
Kevin R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive Immigration
Reform: A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L.R. 1599, 1622 (2010). ("U.S. immigration
laws deviate dramatically from other areas of American law."); Peter H. Schuck,
The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 (1984)
("Immigration has long been a maverick, a wild card, in our public law. Probably
no other area of American law has been so radically insulated and divergent from
those fundamental norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and
judicial role that animate the rest of our legal system.").
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and an abundance of negative discretion, make it difficult to
understand what the law is or how it will be applied.
Immigration law is notoriously complex. For example, Justice
Alito has emphasized the intimidating task of determining whether a
particular criminal offense renders someone removable. 42 Even the
briefest glimpse at the Immigration and Nationality Act and its
accompanying regulations reveals a reader's need for very advanced
statutory reading skills and a healthy amount of patience and
persistence. Immigration law is indeed a labyrinth. It takes intensive
study, even for law professors and seasoned lawyers, to grasp what
the immigration laws are trying to say.
Also, the harshness of the law compounds the complexity. The
scope of activities that may render someone removable has expanded
broadly.43 At the same time, the immigration consequences for those
activities are not proportional.44 Instead, the potential punishment,
no matter the immigration violation, is removal. The stakes are
therefore very high. There is much on the line, and the complexity of
the law makes it difficult to access the law to determine whether
someone has, in fact, done something that renders them removable or
whether there is any potential relief from removal.
In addition to its complexity, immigration law is also infused
with negative discretion. By negative discretion, I mean discretion
granted to immigration adjudicators to deny a benefit or relief, even
though it might look like the person is eligible for the benefit or relief
under the law.45 There is very little room for immigration
adjudicators to consider positive equities. Instead, immigration
adjudicators are given space to deny relief no matter what, and where
equities are considered, the law often prohibits adjudicators from
42 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1489 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring)
(referring to a "dizzying paragraph" in an immigration law guidebook that attempts
to explain whether a particular offense renders someone deportable).
43 Id. at 1478 ("The landscape of federal immigration law has changed
dramatically over the last 90 years. While once there was only a narrow class of
deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent
deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable
offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of
deportation.")
44 See Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1683
(2009).
45 See infra notes 55, 63 to 65, 78, and accompanying text.
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considering the positive equities of the foreign national, but rather
what effect the removal of the foreign national may have on United
States Citizen or green-card holding immediate family members.46
It is not hard to find examples of breathtaking complexity and
negative discretion.47 Elsewhere I have discussed a potential waiver
available to those who are not legally admissible into the United
States due to a controlled substance violation.48 Anyone who
committed, or admits committing, or who admits committing acts
which constitute a controlled substance violation is not admissible.4 9
There is a potential waiver available for those seeking admission as a
lawful permanent resident.so What is required to obtain this waiver,
however, is notoriously difficult to comprehend. It is difficult to
comprehend not only from a statutory interpretation perspective, but
also because there is negative discretion built into the waiver, and the
waiver statute incorporates other ambiguous immigration law
concepts.
From a statutory interpretation perspective, it takes advanced
statutory reading skills to decipher this waiver provision. This
section often causes much grumbling among law students. While it
is a very useful teaching tool, it is troubling to think what a foreign
national representing himself or herself must think of it. Here is a
visualization of the statute's structure:
46 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
4 This discussion continues an exploration of the complexity of substantive
immigration law. See Family, supra note 1.
4 8 Id. at 552-55.
49 See 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).
'o See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
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8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)
AND
$(A) OR () OR
L 0)AND,(i 
ND
OR 5u
BUT NOT anything in the paragraph following (2)
51
See id. Here is the full text of the statute:
(h) Waiver of subsection (a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (1I), (B), (D), and (E)
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive the application of
subparagraphs (A)(i)(I), (B), (D), and (E) of subsection (a)(2) of this
section and subparagraph (A)(i)(II) of such subsection insofar as it relates
to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana
if--
(1)(A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction
of the Attorney General that--
(i) the alien is inadmissible only under subparagraph (D)(i) or (D)(ii)
of such subsection or the activities for which the alien is inadmissible
occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a
visa, admission, or adjustment of status,
(ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be
contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States,
and
(iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or
(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or
daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney
General that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme
hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent,
son, or daughter of such alien; or
(C) the alien is a VAWA self-petitioner; and
(2) the Attorney General, in his discretion, and pursuant to such
terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has
Murky Immigration Law 57Spring 2011
58 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
Once the statute's structure is understood, the next step is to
understand what all of those sections are trying to say. To do so
requires an understanding of other complicated immigration law
concepts, such as "extreme hardship" and what constitutes an
"aggravated felony."52 Extreme hardship is a very fact-specific
standard. To gather a sense of what might constitute extreme
hardship, one needs to be familiar with a body of administrative
decisions that apply the standard to a variety of circumstances. 53
Determining whether a particular crime is an aggravated felony for
immigration purposes requires careful examination of the statute of
conviction to determine if it falls under one of the congressionally
created categories of immigration aggravated felonies.54 Once those
concepts are mastered, there is still negative discretion to conquer.
The executive branch may decide not to grant the waiver, even if the
foreign national satisfies the thicket of statutory requirements. The
statute says that the executive branch "may, in [its] discretion, waive
... if 55
consented to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to
the United States, or adjustment of status.
No waiver shall be provided under this subsection in the case of an
alien who has been convicted of (or who has admitted committing acts
that constitute) murder or criminal acts involving torture, or an attempt or
conspiracy to commit murder or a criminal act involving torture. No
waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who
has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence if either since the date of such
admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony or the
alien has not lawfully resided continuously in the United States for a
period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of initiation
of proceedings to remove the alien from the United States. No court shall
have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General to grant or
deny a waiver under this subsection.
Id.
52 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(2).
3 See, e.g., Matter of Cervantes, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-68 (BIA 1999).
54 For example, one aggravated felony, for immigration purposes, is a "crime
of violence." To determine whether a particular crime is a "crime of violence"
requires a careful comparison of the mental state required by the statute of
conviction versus the mental state required for a crime to qualify as a "crime of
violence." See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).
"See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
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Similarly complex and infused with negative discretion are the
rules governing adjustment of status. Adjustment of status is an
immigration term of art that refers to the process of transforming
one's immigration status to lawful permanent resident (green card
holder) without having to leave the United States. 56 In its typically
overly complicated manner, the law distinguishes procedures for
those who apply for a green card from abroad, versus those who
apply from within the United States." Immigration judges decide
adjustment applications by foreign nationals in removal
proceedings."
The complexity of the adjustment of status statute is revealed
through an examination of who may not adjust status, that is, who
may not transform their status to lawful permanent resident from
within the United States. Adjustment of status is not available to
those: who were not inspected and admitted into the United States;
who are not admissible to the United States; who are not eligible for
an immediately available permanent resident visa; who have engaged
in unauthorized employment; who have not maintained lawful
immigration status; who entered the United States under the Visa
Waiver Program or who entered in transit without a visa; who are
deportable as terrorists; or who violated the terms of a nonimmigrant
visa.59  Understanding each of these exclusions takes considerable
skill. For example, understanding whether someone is admissible to
the United States requires an understanding of the myriad of
inadmissibility grounds and potential waivers (one of which is
described above). Also, understanding whether a permanent resident
visa is immediately available requires comprehension of the complex
visa quota system, while determining whether there has been
unauthorized employment is not always as simple as it may seem it
ought to be.60
56 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
* See Charles Gordon, Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Immigration
Law and Procedure § 51.01.
5 See 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1).
59 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c).
60 Under the employment authorization regulation, there is no single, obvious
and definitive way to determine if a foreign national is authorized to work in the
United States. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12.
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There also are potential exceptions to these bars on adjustment of
status. The bars on adjustment to those who have engaged in
unauthorized employment or have failed to maintain lawful status,
for example, do not apply if the applicant for adjustment is seeking
that transformation as an "immediate relative." 6 1 "Immediate
relative" is another immigration term of art that refers to specific
familial relationships.62 If one is seeking permanent resident status
based on marriage to a United States Citizen, for example, that
person is seeking that status as an immediate relative.
As with the inadmissibility waiver described above, there is also
negative discretion built into the adjustment of status decision-
making process. Even if the complicated statutory requirements are
met, the decision whether to grant adjustment of status is left to the
discretion of the executive branch.63 The statute states that the status
of an individual "may be adjusted" by the executive branch, in its
discretion, if the statutory requirements are met.64  The maze of
statutory requirements is merely a prerequisite to ask the executive
branch to please do not deny the application. 6 5
Asylum cases provide other examples of complexity and negative
discretion. In fiscal year 2009, the immigration courts completed
61 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c).
62 See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
63 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
6 Id.
65 The importance of the adjustment of status procedure is emphasized by
further complexity in the substantive law. Recall that to be eligible to adjust status,
the foreign national must be admissible into the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §
1255(a). One inadmissibility ground provides that if a foreign national has been
"unlawfully present" in the United States for more than 180 days but less than one
year, and then voluntarily departs the United States, this foreign national faces a
three year bar from returning to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). If the unlawful presence period extends to one year or more,
the foreign national faces a ten year bar. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
Determining what counts as unlawful presence is another notoriously complicated
task. There are exceptions, tolling and waiver provisions. See 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)-(v). If a foreign national with unlawful presence wants to
transform to permanent resident status, adjustment of status is unavailable because
he or she is inadmissible. But if the individual leaves the United States to try to
apply for a green card from abroad, the individual will be subject to a three or ten
year bar to readmission.
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44,830 asylum cases. 66 Under the law, the executive branch may
grant asylum to an applicant who establishes that he or she is a
"refugee." 67 A refugee is a person outside of his or her country of
nationality "who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." 68 The applicant has the burden of
proof, and meets that burden by showing that one of the identified
grounds-race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion-"was or will be at least one central
reason" for persecution. 69  To be considered, all applications for
asylum must be filed within one year of the applicant's arrival in the
United States.70
There are many exceptions. Ineligible for asylum is someone
who "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."7 '
Also ineligible are those convicted of a "particularly serious crime,"
those for whom "there are serious reasons for believing [the person]
has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United
States," those for whom there are "reasonable grounds" to regard the
person as a "danger to the security of the United States." 72 Further
exclusions apply to those who fall under terrorism-related removal
grounds.73 Yet another provision denies asylum eligibility if the
applicant "was firmly resettled in another country" before his or her
arrival in the United States, while another provides that asylum is not
available if the applicant may be removed to a safe third country.74
66 2009 Statistical Yearbook at 12.
67 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A).
68 See 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A).
69 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
o See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). There is an exception to the one-year filing
deadline for changed circumstances. See 8 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)(D).
71 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i).
72 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv).
7 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v).
74 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi); 8 U.S.C. § 1l 58(a)(2)(A).
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Asylum law has yielded a large crop of difficult legal questions
and requires adjudicators to make time-intensive and careful factual
determinations. Legal issues include: What counts as a well-founded
fear of persecution?75 What is persecution on account of political
opinion?7 6  What standards should guide an immigration judge's
credibility findings when the applicant's own testimony may be the
only available evidence?77 To adjudicate the claim, an immigration
judge must hear live testimony (often translated), as well as try to
understand the political and societal conditions of the applicant's
home country. This can involve expert testimony and examining
reports translated into English from other languages.
In addition to the complexity of asylum law, asylum law provides
another example of negative discretion. As with the inadmissibility
waiver and adjustment of status, an asylum grant is dependant on the
executive branch's decision to refuse to exercise the negative
discretion afforded to it under the statute. If an applicant is a refugee
and otherwise qualifies for asylum, the executive branch "may grant
asylum."78
These complicated statutes infused with negative discretion
present big challenges for removal adjudication.7 9 Beginning with
caseloads, the complexity of the substantive law cries out for a low
volume adjudication system. Each case takes considerable effort to
adjudicate, no matter if it is an asylum case, or a case that requires
understanding and application of the complicated statutes that govern
admissibility or deportability. Asylum cases require not only
thoughtful consideration of tricky legal issues, but also require time-
intensive credibility determinations. Determining admissibility or
deportability can require resolving novel issues of law, such as
whether a particular crime is an aggravated felony, while also raising
difficult issues of fact, such as whether a removal will result in
extreme hardship. While the substantive law cries out for a low
volume system, the system is engineered for each immigration judge
7 See, e.g., Matter of Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
76 See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
* See Yale-Loehr & Palmer, supra note 9.
78 See 8 U.S.C. § 1 158(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
7 This analysis does not assert that a lack of transparency explains all of the
troubles affecting removal adjudication. For example, the lack of decisional
independence is rooted in a particular bureaucratic structure that could be changed.
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to quickly move through over a thousand intensive hearings per year.
The large backlog is not surprising, given this mismatch.
The complexity of the law and the use of negative discretion are
also linked to the lack of representation problem. There is a steep
learning curve to immigration law, both in terms of mastering the
complexity and in terms of building expertise regarding, or a feel for,
how the negative discretion is exercised. To practice immigration
law well, a lawyer needs to devote his or her practice to, or at least to
dedicate a substantial amount of time and effort to, becoming an
expert on the law. Additionally, the lawyer needs to invest time in
developing networks of informal contacts who can provide advice
about the most opaque areas of the law, such as negative discretion.
It is very difficult to dabble in immigration law, whether for a fee or
pro bono. The opacity of the law creates high barriers to entry,
which may result in fewer lawyers available to take on immigration
cases.80
At the same time, the complexity of the law makes pro se
representation virtually impossible. It is difficult to see how a
foreign national that lacks U.S. legal training, or even a command of
English, will be able to comprehend meaningfully what immigration
law says.81  The futility of pro se representation can lead an
immigration judge to attempt to explain the law to an unrepresented
foreign national. These efforts further compound the caseload
problem by extending the time it takes to complete a hearing.
A foreign national's need to rely on the immigration judge to
explain the law also highlights concerns about the lack of decisional
independence for immigration adjudicators. In immigration court,
the government is represented by immigration counsel, while the
foreign national is not the majority of the time. The foreign national
has little to no chance of understanding the substantive law on his or
her own, thus leaving the foreign national at the mercy of an
so There are other contributors to the lack of lawyers. See Markowitz, supra
note 38, at 546-51, 556-63.
81 The Department of Justice has acknowledged this concern by funding a legal
orientation program. This program attempts to provide detained foreign nationals
in removal proceedings with basic information about the proceedings and about
immigration law itself. U. S. Dep't. of Justice, Executive Office of Immigr.
Review, Legal Orientation Programs, available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/probono/MajorInitiatives.htm.
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immigration judge to explain the law, and that immigration judge is
merely an employee of the Department of Justice.
The complexity of the law and the role of negative discretion
together are connected to the esteem problem, which, in turn, is
linked to the lack of representation problem. The complexity and the
use of negative discretion help to create the negative mystique of
immigration law. Because the law is so difficult to access and to
comprehend, those outside of immigration law are understandably
baffled. Again, the high barriers to entry may dissuade non-specialist
attorneys from taking on immigration cases. The lack of available
representation, in turn, feeds into a negative perception of
immigration adjudication.
This section reveals connections between the lack of transparency
of immigration law and the problems facing removal adjudication.
The opacity of the law is evidenced by its complexity and its embrace
of negative discretion. This lack of transparency makes it difficult
for lawyers, and virtually impossible for foreign nationals, to figure
out what the law is or to predict how it will be applied. The
murkiness of the law opens new lines of inquiry as to why the case
backlogs are so big and why there are too few lawyers for foreign
nationals, while at the same time highlights a concern about a lack of
decisional independence for immigration adjudicators and feeds a
negative impression of immigration law.
III. BENEFITS ADJUDICATION
A. Benefits Adjudication Challenges
Scholars have paid less attention to another subset of immigration
adjudication.82 There are immigration adjudicators other than
immigration judges and members of the Board of Immigration
Appeals. Outside of the context of removal, there is an adjudication
framework established to approve or deny applications for
immigration benefits. For example, every day, individuals and
82 Relatively few scholarly articles address benefits adjudication. Exceptions
include Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary Step
Toward Immigration Law Reform, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 203 (2002) and Stephen H.
Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review ofAgency Adjudication: A Study of the
Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1297 (1986).
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employers file paperwork with the hope of obtaining approval for a
loved one to gain legal immigration status or for a prospective
employee to gain permission to work in the United States. This is a
huge undertaking. United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), a part of the Department of Homeland Security,
reports that on any given day it processes 30,000 applications for
benefits. 83  The benefits adjudication system is facing a crisis of
confidence and confusion. The system is unpredictable and
obscure. 84  The unpredictability is tied to complaints about an
uncertainty of what legal standards the system will apply, and the
obscurity is tied to complaints about mysterious decision-making
processes.8 5
The benefits adjudication framework includes both an initial
decision-making level and a level of administrative appeal, but
otherwise this benefits framework vastly differs from the removal
83 See U.S. Dep't. of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs.,
A Day in the Life of USCIS (Feb. 2009), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/dayinthelife.pdf.
84 The unpredictability and obscurity of the process is not a new phenomenon.
See Benson, supra note 82, at 318 ("[U]nderstanding the procedures used to
properly file the applications, identifying the standards the adjudicator will apply,
predicting the outcome in any particular case, and measuring the consistency of the
adjudications are all extremely difficult, if not impossible tasks.")
81 See, e.g., Matt Cameron, This Whole Court Is Out of Order! Why the AAO
Has No Reason to Live, and Why It Matters, Mass Appeal!, June 11, 2009,
available at http://www.mattcameronlaw.com/2009/06/this-whole-court-is-out-of-
order-why-the-aao-has-no-reason-to-live-and-why-it-matters/ (but see Matt
Cameron, This Whole Court is Not Entirely Out of Order! How the AAO has
Improved and Why it Matters, Mass Appeal!, available at
http://www.mattcameronlaw.com/2010/10/this-whole-court-is-not-entirely-out-of-
order-how-the-aao-has-improved-and-why-it-matters/); Memorandum from
Prakash Khatri, CIS Ombudsman, to Robert Divine, Acting Deputy Director,
USCIS, Recommendation from the CIS Ombudsman to the Director, USCIS (Dec.
6, 2005), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOmbudsmanRR 20_AdministrativeAppe
als_1 2-07-05.pdf; Brandon Meyer, The Administrative Procedures Act and USCIS
Adjudications: Following the Law?, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS (May 2009); U.S. Dep't.
of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Questions and
Answers: USCIS American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) Meeting at 2,
March 19, 2009, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/ailaaao qa_19march09.pdf. See also
Benson, supra note 82.
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framework discussed above. An example helps to explain the
benefits framework. If an employer wishes to ask the government for
a temporary work visa for a potential employee, the employer files a
petition with USCIS.16 A front-line adjudicator reviews the petition
and ultimately approves or denies it." The adjudicator's initial
response may be to issue a Request for Evidence to ask for
clarification or additional evidence, but ultimately the adjudicator
will dispense with the petition through an approval or a denial.8 8 To
decide, the adjudicator will rely on the Immigration and Nationality
Act, other federal statutes, regulations and a dizzying array of agency
guidance materials, such as the Adjudicator's Field Manual,
Operation Instructions and individual memoranda.8 9
These front-line adjudicators are not immigration judges.
Instead, they are employees of USCIS, and these adjudicators are not
required to be lawyers, despite that the job requires adjudicators to
"[i]ndependently research, interpret and analyze an extensive
spectrum of sources including pertinent sections of the law and
regulations, operating instructions, references and guidance contained
in legislative history, precedent decisions, state and local laws,
international treaties and other legal references . . . ."90 New
adjudicators undergo eight weeks of training, 9 1 and most are attached
to a regional service center, where they process each petition based
86 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(i). An approved Labor Condition
Application from the Department of Labor may be a prerequisite to obtaining an
approved petition from USCIS. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(ii)(B)(1). Also, if
the employee is overseas, the employee will need to apply to the Department of
State for a visa to travel to the United States after receiving petition approval from
USCIS. This paper focuses on the adjudication of petitions within USCIS, and
does not address the Department of Labor's processes or the Department of State's
decision-making process regarding the issuance of visas. For a broader discussion
of the benefits application process, see Benson, supra note 82, at 220-62.
87 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(9)-(10).
8 See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8).
8 U.S. Dep't. of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs.,
Adjudicator's Field Manual, at § 3.4(a). The Adjudicator's Field Manual is
available through USCIS' website, uscis.gov, by clicking on "Laws" and then
"Immigration Handbooks, Manuals and Guidance."
90 USAJOBS listing number CIS-364380-NBC, Immigration Services Officer,
Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Services (on file
with author).
9' See id.
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solely on a paper or electronic submission.92 USCIS employed 3,683
adjudicators as of August 30, 2008.93
The front-line adjudication process is unpredictable. It is difficult
to predict what legal standards one particular adjudicator may apply
in a given application.94 Part of the uncertainty can be traced to the
agency's use of guidance documents, addressed below.95 This
unpredictability also manifests in the context of the Request for
Evidence. 96  Immigration attorneys have expressed concern about
rogue, overly broad requests for evidence that ask for information
that is not relevant under what the lawyer at least perceives to be the
legal standard for adjudication.9 7  USCIS has acknowledged the
concern by beginning the "Request for Evidence (RFE) Project,"
which aims to "engage stakeholders in a concerted effort to review
and revise the RFE [Request for Evidence] templates used at the
Service Centers" and to, in part, ensure their consistency and
relevancy.98
92 Adjudications officers positioned at the service centers are responsible for
about 70% of USCIS adjudications. U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., USCIS
Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2008 at 56, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/Reports/uscis-annual-report-2008.pdf.
93 Id. at 38.
94 See supra note 85.
95 See infra Part III(B).
96 "Based on feedback from stakeholders across the country, few processes
rival Requests for Evidence (RFEs) as a source of widespread public concern about
lack of uniformity and efficiency in USCIS adjudications." U.S. Dep't. of
Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman Annual
Report 2010 at 36 (June 30, 2010), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cisomb_2010_annual report to congress.pdf.
9 One immigration attorney has called this phenomenon "rulemaking by RFE
[Request for Evidence]." Charles Kuck, What Happens When USCIS Breaks the
Law? (Jan. 31, 2010), available at http://ailaleadershipblog.org/2010/01/3 1/what-
happens-when-uscis-breaks-the-law/. See also Angelo A. Paparelli, I am Furious
(Yellow)-at USCIS and its AAO (March 13, 2011) available at
http://www.nationofimmigrators.com/general-immigration/i-am-furious-yellow----
at-uscis/ (referring to the "ever-proliferating boilerplate Request for Additional
Evidence, asking for the sun, the moon and the kitchen sink. . . .").
98 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Executive Summary, Listening
Session- Request for Evidence (RFE) Review and Revision (April 12, 2010),
available from USCIS' website by clicking on "Outreach," and then "Notes from
Previous Engagements." On August 18, 2010, USCIS issued an Interim Policy
Memorandum for comment addressing the need for consistency. U. S. Citizenship
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The Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) hears administrative
appeals of certain decisions made by these front-line adjudicators,
including our hypothetical temporary worker petition. The AAO is
also a part of USCIS.99 It is one of eleven program offices that report
to the Director of USCIS. 00  Other program offices include
Legislative Affairs, Policy and Strategy and the Chief Counsel's
office. Parallel to these program offices within USCIS are seven
directorates.' One directorate, for example, is Service Center
Operations, which includes the work of the front-line adjudicators
whose work is reviewed by the AAO.102  Despite the parallel
framework, the AAO has described its relationship with a Service
Center as "analogous to the relationship between a United States
Court of Appeals for a particular circuit and a United States District
Court for a district within the territory of that circuit."l 03 Here is an
organizational chart visualizing the structure:
and Immigr. Servs., Policy Memorandum, PM-602-0005, 87 INTERP. RELEASES
1661 (Aug. 23, 2010). This Interim Policy Memorandum provides guidance for
adjudicators considering certain types of benefit applications. The memorandum
states its purpose as "to ensure that [USCIS] processes [these] petitions . . . with a
consistent standard." Id.
9 Information about the AAO can be found on USCIS's website, uscis.gov, by
clicking on "About us," then "Directorates and Program Offices."
100 See USCIS Organizational Chart (accessible on USCIS's website,
uscis.gov, by clicking on "About us," and then "USCIS Organizational Chart" in
the "More Information" box to the right.
101 See id.
102 See id
103 AAO Response to Freedom of Information Act Request of the Center for
Human Rights and Constitutional Law at 21 (on file with author).
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In 2011, USCIS reported that "88 employees, 59 of whom are
adjudications officers," staffed the AAO.'0o Not all adjudicators are
attorneys, but the majority are attorneys. 1 0 6 The AAO is split into
nine branches, divided by type of petition.o7 In April 2010, the
Chief of the AAO reported that the AAO had between 14,000-15,000
appeals pending. 08
1" See supra note 100.
"os U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Executive Summary, USCIS
Administrative Appeals Office Stakeholder Engagement at 1 (Feb. 2, 2011),
available from USCIS' website by clicking on "Outreach" and then "Notes from
Previous Engagements." New adjudicators may be on the way. See id.; American
Immigration Lawyers Association, AAO Updates at 1 (Dec. 3, 2010) (on file with
author).
"o6 USCIS Administrative Appeals Office Stakeholder Engagement, supra note
105, at 4. The appeals officer position requires "detailed analysis of the pertinent
facts in the context of applicable law, regulations, and appropriate precedent . . .
AAO Response to Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 103, at 8.
'07 Information about the AAO can be found on USCIS's website, uscis.gov,
by clicking on "About us," then "Directorates and Program Offices."
108 U. S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Executive Summary, Vermont Service
Center Stakeholder Engagement (April 19, 2010), available from USCIS' website
by clicking on "Outreach," and then "Notes from Previous Engagements." In
documentation obtained by the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law,
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Identifying the jurisdiction of the AAO is no easy task. The
AAO has expressed its intent to clarify its jurisdiction through a
regulation, but has not done so.10 9 The instructions on the form used
to file an appeal (Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion), state
that the form is used "to file an appeal . . . over which the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) does not have appellate jurisdiction."'' 0
The instructions also reference 8 C.F.R. § 103.3. According to 8
C.F.R. § 103.3, "[d]ecisions under the appellate jurisdiction of the
[AAO] are listed in § 103.1(f)(2)."" Section 103.1(f) no longer
exists, however. At the time of the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security in 2003, Secretary of Homeland Security Tom
Ridge delegated to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services (now USCIS) the authority "to exercise appellate
jurisdiction over the matters described in 8 C.F.R. §
103.1(f)(3)(E)(iii) (as in effect on February 28, 2003)."l12 Once the
February 28, 2003 version of 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(f)(3)(E)(iii) is located,
one finds a list of over forty different matters subject to the AAO's
jurisdiction. In general, the AAO hears appeals over benefits
applications, except for appeals based on family-based petitions for
benefits (based on a familial relationship, rather than an employment
the AAO reported over 12,000 pending appeals at the end of fiscal year 2010.
AAO Response to Freedom of Information Act Request, supra note 103, at 381.
109 Email from Perry Rhew, Chief, Administrative Appeals Office, to Matt
Cameron (Oct. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.mattcameronlaw.com/2010/10/this-whole-court-is-not-entirely-out-of-
order-how-the-aao-has-improved-and-why-it-matters/. In the published notes of an
October 2009 meeting between USCIS and the American Immigration Lawyers
Association, USCIS stated that the AAO had drafted a proposed rule to "update and
re-insert" information about the AAO's jurisdiction. U. S. Citizenship and Immigr.
Servs., USCIS-American Immigration Law Association (AILA) October Meeting
(Oct. 27, 2009), available from USCIS' website by clicking on "Outreach," and
then "Notes from Previous Engagements."
no U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Instructions, Form I-290B, Notice of
Appeal or Motion, available from USCIS's website by clicking on "Forms."
"' See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(ii).
112 U.S. Dep't. of Homeland Security, Delegation to the Bureau of Citizenship
and Immigration Services, Delegation 0150.1 (U) (Mar. 1, 2003). Finding this
delegation is difficult. The author obtained a copy from the AAO. See also U.S. v.
Gonzales & Gonzales Bonds and Ins. Agency, Inc., 728 F. Supp.2d at 1082-83
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (describing the complicated source of the AAO's jurisdiction).
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relationship). 113 The family-based appeals are directed to the Board
of Immigration Appeals." 4
The AAO's standard of review is also difficult to locate. The
AAO employs de novo review, but that standard arises from case
law." 5  Despite reference to a planned Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to address the standard of review, to date no such notice
has been placed in the federal register."16
Only petitioners or applicants (and not beneficiaries) may file
appeals to the AAO, and appeals generally must be filed within thirty
days of the decision."' Appellants may be represented by an
attorney." 8 Appellants may request oral argument, although there is
no standard publically available as to when oral argument is
appropriate." 9 Briefs are accepted, but not mandatory, and the filing
fee for an appeal is $585.120
Once an appeal is properly filed, the original adjudicating officer
reviews the appeal and decides whether to grant the appeal or to
forward the appeal to the AAO.121 Once at the AAO, an individual
officer reviews the appeal and drafts a decision, which is subject to
supervisory review by an "Editor." 22  AAO decisions are
anonymous, however, as they are issued in the name of the AAO
113 See Immigration Law and Procedure, supra note 57, at § 3.02(6)(a).
114 1d
115 See Memorandum from Prakash Khatri, supra note 85, at 2.
116 U.S. Dep't. of Homeland Security, U. S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs.,
Questions and Answers: USCIS American Immigration Lawyers Association
(AILA) Meeting, supra note 85, at 17.
117 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(i).
118 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B).
"1 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(b); Memorandum from Prakash Khatri, supra note 85, at
3.
120 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(vi); Instructions, Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or
Motion, available from USCIS' website by clicking "Forms."
121 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(ii)-(iv).
122 Memorandum from Prakash Khatri, supra note 85, at 2; U.S. Citizenship
and Immigr. Servs., AAO Flow Chart, available from USCIS' website by searching
for "AAO Flow Chart" within the site.
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only and signed by the Editor, Branch Chief, Deputy Chief or
Chief.'23
As of July 2010, AAO processing times ranged from two to
twenty-six months.' 24 For our temporary worker example, as of July
2010, the AAO took from eight to twelve months (depending on the
precise classification) to adjudicate an appeal.125 The AAO reported
in March 2009 that it collects data on its workload for its internal use,
but does not share that data with outside entities (including the
public) because the data "are not . . . official USCIS production data
and are not 100% accurate." 2 6
All AAO decisions are public, but each decision, by regulatory
default, is non-precedential.127 Some AAO decisions are available on
the USCIS website, but only those dating back to 2005 are
available,128 and the available opinions are not searchable.129 USCIS
123 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., AAO Flow Chart, supra note 122;
Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary Step Toward
Immigration Law Reform, supra note 82 at 290.
124 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., AAO Processing Times as of July 1,
2010 (on file with author).
121 Id. The AAO reported improved processing times in early 2011. USCIS
Administrative Appeals Office Stakeholder Engagement, supra note 105, at 3.
126 U.S. Dep't. of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs.,
Questions and Answers: USCIS American Immigration Lawyers Association
(AILA) Meeting, supra note 85, at 16. See also USCIS Administrative Appeals
Office Stakeholder Engagement, supra note 105, at 4 ("USCIS noted that it is
limited in its ability to provide statistics as the statistics are not owned by the
agency, but rather, are owned by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
("DHS").
127 Immigration Law and Procedure, supra note 57, at § 3.02(6)(c)(vii).
128 E-mail from Suzie Clarke, Community Relations Officer, Office of Public
Engagement, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, to the author, Dec. 1, 2010. In response to the question
whether every AAO non-precedential opinion is included on the website, the AAO
responded that the available opinions date back to 2005 and that the AAO
"forward[s] all of the decisions in the categories listed on the website for
publication." Id. Whether that means there are categories of opinions not listed on
the website is unclear. See also USCIS Administrative Appeals Office Stakeholder
Engagement, supra note 105 at 3 ("USCIS recognized that accessing information,
particularly AAO decisions, still remains an issue . . . ."),
129 In a December 2010 Liaison Report, the American Immigration Lawyers
Association recommended to its members to use a Google Advanced Search to
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may designate certain decisions precedential. Only these precedent
decisions are binding upon the agency. 3 o There are no regulations
that govern how and when a particular decision becomes
precedential, but apparently both the Department of Homeland
Security and the Department of Justice must agree on the label.' 3 '
According to a PowerPoint presentation posted on the USCIS
website, the following entities review a decision before it receives the
precedential label: USCIS Administrative Appeals Office; USCIS
Office of Chief Counsel; USCIS Director; Department of Homeland
Security Office of General Counsel; Department of Justice Executive
Office for Immigration Review; Department of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel; and Department of Justice Board of Immigration
Appeals.13 2
The USCIS ombudsman reported in 2005 that, according to the
AAO, decisions are of precedential value when a decision addresses
a '"novel issue of law or fact and when it is necessary to provide
clear and uniform guidance concerning the proper implementation
and administration of the statute and regulations where applicable
regulations are unclear or silent."'l 33 In this same 2005 memo, the
ombudsman highlighted that no decision had earned the "precedent"
label since 1998. In October 2010, the AAO issued two precedential
decisions, its first since 1998.134 From 1998 until 2010, we may
assume, then, that there were no cases raising novel issues of law or
search for terms within the AAO opinions posted on the USCIS website. American
Immigration Lawyers Association, AAO Updates, supra note 105, at 4.
130 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c).
13' Immigration Law and Procedure, supra note 57, at § 3.02(6)(c)(vii);
Memorandum from Prakash Khatri, supra note 85, at 2-3.
132 In researching the AAO, it is not unusual only to find information in less
formal sources. U.S. Dep't. of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigr. Servs.,
Administrative Appeals Office: Precedent Decisions, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/AAO/AAO%20DHS%20Precedent%2ODecisio
n%20Process%20Print%2OVersion.pdf.
133 Memorandum from Prakash Khatri, supra note 85, at 2-3 (quoting response
from AAO to CIS Ombudsman).
134 In re Wazzan, 25 I&N Dec. 359 (AAO 2010); In re Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec.
369 (AAO 2010). Both of these decisions were already existing decisions that the
AAO labeled precedential in 2010. The American Immigration Lawyers
Association reported that the AAO expects to issue ten to twelve precedent
decisions per year moving forward. American Immigration Lawyers Association,
AAO Updates, supra note 105, at 1.
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fact and that there was never a need for clear and uniform guidance.
In the complex world of immigration law, that seems highly unlikely.
Or, perhaps, the AAO, for some reason or reasons, chose not to issue
any precedential decisions. There is some indication that the process
of issuing a precedential opinion is at least part of the problem. The
lengthy and difficult process to adopt a precedent decision lead the
AAO to create a new category of decision-an "adopted" decision. 3 5
An adopted decision is treated as binding policy guidance and serves
as a transition status while the precedential review is taking place.' 36
The AAO contributes to the crisis in immigration benefits
adjudication through its obscurity. The AAO is an obscure
organization that has a mysterious reputation. 13 Its obscurity is
caused by its bureaucratic placement as just another piece of USCIS,
even in placement with those whose work it reviews and with those
who make agency policy, and the lack of information available about
the AAO, including its operating practices. This obscurity is only
enhanced by the use of agency guidance documents within USCIS, a
topic addressed below.
The AAO itself seems to recognize its mysterious reputation.
The AAO recently has taken several steps to increase its
transparency, but its adjudication still remains murky. For example,
in 2010, the AAO launched its first presence on the Internet through
the USCIS website.13 8 The AAO information is not easy to navigate,
however, and there is an absence of information about AAO
workload. While AAO opinions are now posted on this website, the
opinions date back only to 2005, and the opinions are not searchable.
Also, while the AAO did announce two precedent decisions in 2010,
even the AAO acknowledged it was an "effort" to do so, and those
two opinions clarify only a tiny fraction of the outstanding issues. 139
'" Immigration Law and Procedure, supra note 57, at § 3.02(6)(c)(vii).
"6Id.
13 Cameron, supra note 85. See also Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders,
supra note 82, at 247-48.
138 E-mail from Perry Rhew, Chief, Administrative Appeals Office, to Matt
Cameron, supra note 109. AAO Chief Rhew has initiated an effort to "enlighten
the public on how the AAO conducts business." USCIS Administrative Appeals
Office Stakeholder Engagement, supra note 105, at 1.
'" E-mail from Perry Rhew, Chief, Administrative Appeals Office, to Matt
Cameron, supra note 109; For a discussion of some unanswered immigration
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The mystery surrounding the AAO, in combination with shifting
standards applied by front-line adjudicators, and the agency's use of
administrative guidance discussed below, has created a crisis of
confidence and confusion in immigration benefits adjudication. The
AAO "may be the most mysterious appellate body in the American
legal system," 40 while USCIS adjudication involves the application
of standards that "vary in consistency" and also features
"unannounced shifts in adjudication patterns."l 4 1 As the American
Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA)142 has described, "there is
a general inability to determine what the requirements are for key
visa categories leaving U.S. employers and applicants 'in the
dark."' 43
B. A Lack of Transparency: The Use ofAdministrative Guidance and
the Obscurity of the Administrative Appeals Office
This section explores how a lack of transparency in immigration
law, manifested by USCIS' use of administrative guidance and the
obscurity of the AAO, are connected to the lack of confidence in and
confusion about the benefits adjudication system. The agency's
over-use of guidance documents contributes to a lack of transparency
because an extreme lack of force-of-law regulations leaves precious
little firm ground in immigration benefits adjudication. The agency's
tendency to govern by memo raises doubts as to what the law is
benefits questions, see Naomi Schorr, It Makes You Want To Scream-Who
Knows?, 15 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1387 (Oct. 15, 2010).
140 Cameron, supra note 85.
141 Meyer, supra note 85. See also Paparelli, supra note 97.
142 The American Immigration Lawyers Association is the premier
organization representing the interests of private bar immigration attorneys. See
American Immigration Lawyers Association, About AILA, available at
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=1021.
143 U.S. Dep't. of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs.,
Questions and Answers: USCIS American Immigration Lawyers Association
(AILA) Meeting, supra note 85, at 2. As Professor Lenni Benson has observed, the
problem is even deeper in that stakeholders are confused about more than just the
substantive requirements. Stakeholders are also confused by obscure procedural
obligations. Benson, supra note 82, at 312.
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today and what it might be tomorrow.114 The obscurity of the AAO
does little to resolve questions of what law the agency will apply. In
fact, the practices of the AAO serve to heighten concerns about
unpredictability.
Controversy surrounding the use of administrative guidance is not
unique to immigration law. Administrative guidance consists of sub-
regulatory agency documents that "guide" the agency and the public
as to an agency's interpretation of other legal sources or that "guide"
the agency and the public as to the agency's outlook on enforcement
issues not wholly or specifically addressed through statutes or
regulations. 145 Guidance allows an agency to fill in the gaps and to
provide information to agency officials and the public without the
procedural hurdles and time investment of notice and comment
rulemaking. Under notice and comment rulemaking, the
Administrative Procedures Act generally requires an agency to
publish notice of a proposed rule, to accept and consider public
comments on the proposed rule, and then to issue a final rule after the
comment period.146 The product of notice and comment rulemaking
is a legislative rule. 47 Only legislative rules are binding and have the
force of law.14 8
The Administrative Procedures Act exempts guidance documents
from the requirements of notice and comment rulemaking.149
Agencies are permitted to use guidance documents in certain
circumstances, but those guidance documents are not binding, and
again, do not have the force of law.'s 0 Determining the proper use of
such guidance documents is a notoriously complex area of
1" The procedural obstacles documented by Professor Benson are another
source of uncertainty. Benson, supra note 82, at 208 ("The immigration process is
so replete with procedural obstacles that employers and would-be immigrants are
unable to predict when or if their petitions will be approved.")
145 See generally, Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY
RULEMAKING at 73-104 (2006).
146 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d).
147 Lubbers, supra note 145, at 74-75.
148 Id
149 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).
150 Lubbers, supra note 145, at 74-75.
administrative law.'"' The complexity arises in part because while
these guidance documents do not de jure hold the force of law and
are not legally binding, they have the effect of law because agency
officials and the public tend to view the information in the guidance
document as if it is law.
The Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") published a
final bulletin in 2007 establishing "Agency Good Guidance
Practices" in response to concerns "that agency guidance practices
should be more transparent, consistent and accountable." 5 2  The
OMB cited the promise of agency guidance-constraining agency
discretion and increasing efficiency and fairness-but also
acknowledged the existence of "poorly designed or improperly
implemented" guidance documents, as well as the lure of overusing
guidance documents in lieu of engaging in rulemaking.' OMB
expressed that the Good Guidance Practices aimed to "ensure" that
guidance documents are "developed with appropriate review and
public participation, accessible and transparent to the public, of high
quality, and not improperly treated as legally binding
requirements."' 5 4  By establishing the Good Guidance Practices,
OMB addressed both the issues of improper reliance on guidance
documents when rulemaking is needed and of how guidance is
developed.
The Administrative Conference of the United States addressed
similar issues in 1992.' The Conference expressed its concern
about "situations where agencies issue [guidance documents] which
they treat or which are reasonably regarded by the public as binding
and dispositive of the issues they address."' 56 In response to this
concern, the Conference recommended that agencies not use
15' The analysis for determining when an agency has properly employed a
guidance document in lieu of rulemaking is described as "enshrouded in
considerable smog." Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975).
152 Office of Management and Budget, Final Bulletin for Agency Good
Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 3433. The Obama Administration revoked the Good Guidance
Practices. See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 22 (Jan. 30, 2009).
' 5 Administrative Conference of the United States, Agency Policy Statements
(Recommendation No. 92-2), 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-2 (July 8, 1992).56 id.
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guidance documents "to impose binding substantive standards or
obligations."' When an agency does issue a guidance document,
the Conference recommended that the agency make clear its
nonbinding nature both to agency staff and to the public.'5 8 To allow
for feedback from affected parties, the Conference further
recommended that agencies allow "requests for modification or
reconsideration" of agency guidance documents.' Such a procedure
not only would allow affected parties a chance to challenge the
contents of a guidance document, but also could serve as a signal to
an agency that the subject of the guidance document is better
addressed through notice and comment rulemaking.160
Issues of misunderstanding the proper use of guidance and a lack
of transparency in the creation of guidance are highly relevant to
immigration law. AILA has expressed its concern and frustration
over the lack of transparency in USCIS adjudications, and has
explained that the use of guidance plays a role in that lack of
transparency.16 1 Also, USCIS appears to rely on guidance to great
extent. In fact, since the founding of the Department of Homeland
Security in 2003, USCIS has only placed sixteen Notices of Proposed
Rulemaking in the Federal Register. 16 2 About half of those notices
deal with procedural issues (such as the adjustment of application
fees) and the establishment of a genealogy program.163
The over-use of guidance affects both adjudicators and
stakeholders. For example, the Adjudicator's Field Manual contains
a section titled "Adherence to Policy" that instructs USCIS
adjudicators that there is a difference between correspondence and
policy.' According to the Manual:
157id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
Iso9
161 U.S. Dep't. of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs.,
Questions and Answers: USCIS American Immigration Lawyers Association
(AILA) Meeting, supra note 85, at 2-3.
162 The sixteen Notices of Proposed Rulemaking were discovered by searching
for USCIS Proposed Rules on regulations.gov.
163 dj
'" Adjudicator's Field Manual, supra note 89, at § 3.4.
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It is important to note that there is a distinction
between "correspondence" and "policy" materials.
Policy material is binding on all USCIS officers and
must be adhered to unless and until revised, rescinded
or superseded by law, regulation or subsequent policy,
either specifically or by application of more recent
policy material. On the other hand, correspondence is
advisory in nature, intended only to convey the
author's point of view. Such opinions should be given
appropriate weight by the recipient as well as other
USCIS employees who may encounter similar
situations. However, such correspondence does not
dictate any binding course of action which must be
followed by subordinates within the chain of
command.'65
As examples of "policy," the manual lists statutes and
regulations, field manuals, operations instructions, precedent
decisions, and memoranda bearing the label "P," for policy.' 66
Examples of correspondence include non-precedent decisions and
memoranda not bearing the label "P." 67  Notwithstanding the
Manual's use of terminology that is inconsistent with the
Administrative Procedures Act, the Manual appears to take a position
that is also plainly at odds with the Act. The Manual explains that
some guidance documents, such as memoranda bearing the label "P,"
are binding on the agency. This seems to contradict the Act, which
declares that only notice and comment rules are binding. To further
complicate matters, the Introduction to the Manual states, "Important
Notice: Nothing in the [Manual] shall be construed to create any
substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable
by any party against the United States or its agencies or officers or
any other person."l 68  Under the Manual's own version of
administrative law, certain guidance documents are binding on the
agency, but those documents do not create any legally enforceable
165 Id. at § 3.4(a).
166 d
168 Id. at Introduction to the Adjudicator's Field Manual.
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right. The agency may rely on those documents, but the public may
not.
USCIS itself recognizes its guidance troubles. In 2010 it
announced an agency-wide policy review and sought stakeholder
input to prioritize its review.16 9 USCIS Director Alejandro Mayorkas
said, "As an agency, we must achieve consistency in the policies that
guide us and in how we implement them for the public benefit."7 o
Also, USCIS recently began to post draft guidance memoranda for
comment on its website as a part of "a continued effort to promote
transparency and consistency in [USCIS] operations."' 7
The problems with guidance appear to be multifaceted. One
issue is the agency's use of changing standards through guidance.172
A second issue is the use of guidance at all, when rulemaking is
appropriate.173  A third issue specifically addresses problems
presented by the AAO's treatment of agency guidance.' 74  These
three issues are discussed below by examining a few current
controversies in immigration benefits adjudication.
One of the available visa categories for highly skilled workers is
called H-lB.175  This is a nonimmigrant category that allows
temporary admission to an individual coming to the United States to
fill a specialty occupation.176  A specialty occupation is one that
169 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., USCIS Announces First Ten Areas of
Focus for Agency-wide Policy Review (July 26, 2010), available on USCIS'
website by clicking on "News."
170 d
171 USCIS posts the drafts on a section of its website called Draft
Memorandum for Comment, which is available by visiting USCIS's website,
clicking on "Outreach," and then clicking on "Feedback Opportunities."
172 See Meyer, supra note 85 (describing a scenario where "the rules of the
game [are] subject to change without notice"); see also David H.E. Becker,
Judicial Review of INS Adjudication: When May the Agency Make Sudden
Changes in Policy and Apply Its Decisions Retroactively?, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 219
(2000).
I7 See Meyer, supra note 85 (describing a policy memorandum as "a poor
substitute for proper rulemaking under the APA").
17 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't. of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr.
Servs., Questions and Answers: USCIS American Immigration Lawyers
Association (AILA) Meeting, supra note 85, at 2-3; Schorr, supra note 139.
175 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(B).
176Id
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requires "theoretical and practical application of a body of highly
specialized knowledge" and requires the "attainment of a bachelor's
or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a
minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.""' As a
part of an H-lB application to USCIS, the potential employer must
submit a petition to USCIS seeking H-lB status for a potential
employee (or seek renewal of that status). 7 8 The petitioner must also
include a Labor Condition Application approved by the Department
of Labor with the petition to USCIS.179
While there are regulations governing the H-iB category,8 o there
are also many policy memoranda that address the category.' 8 ' Of
particular controversy is a 19 page memorandum dated January 8,
2010 from Donald Neufeld, the Associate Director for Service Center
Operations.' 82 This memorandum illustrates the problem of shifting
standards through guidance, as well as the use of guidance instead of
rulemaking. This "Neufeld Memo" to USCIS Service Center
Directors addresses the standard used to determine whether an H-1B
petitioner (potential employer) would hold the necessary employment
relationship with the H-iB beneficiary (potential employee).18 3
Buried on page ten of the Memo is a statement that the Memo "is
intended solely for the training and guidance of USCIS personnel in
177 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1)(A)-(B).
18 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(i).
179 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(1).
18 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h).
181 See, e.g., Michael D. Cronin, Initial Guidance for Processing H-lB
Petitions as Affected by the "American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First
Century Act" (Public Law 106-313) and Related Legislation (Public Law 106-311)
and (Public Law 106-396) (June 19, 2001); William R. Yates, Interim Guidance
for Processing Form 1-140 Employment-Based Immigrant Petitions and Form I-
485 and H-1B Petitions Affected by the AC21 Act (May 12, 2005); Barbara Q.
Valarde, Requirements for H-1B Beneficiaries Seeking to Practice in a Health Care
Occupation (May 20, 2009). Policy memoranda are available by visiting USCIS's
website by clicking "Laws," then "Policy Memoranda," and then "By Subject."
These policy memoranda are listed under the "H-I Visas" Category.
182 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Donald Neufeld, Determining
Employer-Employee Relationship for Adjudication of H-lB Petitions, Including
Third-Party Site Placements (Jan. 8, 2010), available by visiting USCIS's website
by clicking "Laws," then "Policy Memoranda," and then "By Subject." This policy
memorandum is listed under the "H- 1 Visas" Category.
183 id.
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performing their duties . . .. It is not intended to, does not, and may
not be relied upon to create any right or benefit . . . enforceable at
law...."1 84 The substance of the Memo, however, sends mixed signals
about its legal effect.
For purposes of the H-1B category, a regulation defines an
employer as:
[A] person, firm, corporation, contractor, or other
association, or organization in the United States
which:
(1) Engages a person to work within the United
States;
(2) Has an employer-employee relationship with
respect to employees under this part, as indicated by
the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or
otherwise control the work of any such employee; and
(3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax
identification number.'85
The Neufeld Memo addresses what constitutes an employer-
employee relationship for the purpose of adjudicating H-lB petitions.
As the Neufeld Memo explains, prior to the issuance of the Memo,
USCIS relied on common law principles and Supreme Court cases in
adjudicating whether the appropriate relationship exists for H-1B
purposes.18 6  According to the Memo, the absence of agency
guidance on the subject caused problems, "in particular, with
independent contractors, self-employed beneficiaries, and
beneficiaries placed at third-party worksites."'17 The Memo makes it
more difficult for self-employed entrepreneurs and staffing firms to
prove an employer-employee relationship exists, thus narrowing
access to the H-lB category.
The Neufeld Memo establishes a vision of control-that is
petitioner control over the beneficiary-that calls into question
employment arrangements other than traditional employment. The
Memo instructs that in adjudicating H-1B petitions, "[t]he petitioner
'Id. at 10-11.
185 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (emphasis added).
'
86 Neufeld Memo, supra note 182, at 2.
87 Id.
31-1
must be able to establish that it has the right to control over when,
where and how the beneficiary performs the job . . . ."I" The Memo
lists eleven factors that USCIS "will consider" in adjudicating H-1B
petitions.' 89 It is important to list all eleven, as the factors reveal how
the Neufeld Memo instructs adjudicators to consider the issue:
(1) Does the petitioner supervise the beneficiary and is such
supervision off-site or on-site?
(2) If the supervision is off-site, how does the petitioner
maintain such supervision, i.e. weekly calls, reporting
back to main office routinely, or site visits by the
petitioner?
(3) Does the petitioner have the right to control the work of
the beneficiary on a day-to-day basis if such control is
required?
(4) Does the petitioner provide the tools or instrumentalities
needed for the beneficiary to perform the duties of
employment?
(5) Does the petitioner hire, pay, and have the ability to fire
the beneficiary?
(6) Does the petitioner evaluate the work-product of the
beneficiary, i.e. progress/performance reviews?
(7) Does the petitioner claim the beneficiary for tax
purposes?
(8) Does the petitioner provide the beneficiary any type of
employee benefits?
(9) Does the beneficiary use proprietary information of the
petitioner in order to perform the duties of employment?
(1O)Does the beneficiary produce an end-product that is
directly linked to the petitioner's line of business?
(11)Does the petitioner have the ability to control the manner
and means in which the work product of the beneficiary
is accomplished? 90
" Id. at 3.
18 Id. (emphasis added).
'
90 Id.at 3-4.
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The Memo further advises that these factors are a part of a totality
of the circumstances test aimed at establishing a right of control
throughout the length of the beneficiary's proposed stay in H-1B
status.191
Despite the Memo's acknowledgement that this inquiry is
inherently case-specific, the Memo presents scenarios that would fail
the test. First, self-employed beneficiaries fail the test because the
petitioning company, despite that it may be a separate corporate
entity, is the beneficiary, and thus there is no evidence that the
petitioning company will have control over the beneficiary.1 92
Second, independent contractors fail the test where, for example, a
salesperson engaged by the petitioner also sells other products and
the petitioner does not set the work schedule or conduct performance
reviews of the salesperson.193 Third, the Memo establishes that third-
party placements fail the test. The Memo provides an example of a
third-party placement: a computer consulting company that contracts
with other companies to provide staff to the other company, and
where the other company, and not the petitioning consulting
company, supervises the daily work.' 94
Stakeholders have described the requirements of the Neufeld
Memo as "demanding, burdensome and commercially unreasonable"
and as formulated "without APA compliance or policy rationale."' 95
AILA described the Memo as "significantly alter[ing] USCIS'
definition of the employer-employee relationship."' 96 Of concern are
both the content of the Memo and the procedure used to announce the
content. Ironically, USCIS stated that the Memo was not intended to
change policy but rather to increase transparency and consistency. 97
191 Id.at 4.
'
92 Id. at 5-6.
193 Id. at 6.
194 Id. at 6-7.
19s Angelo A. Paparelli and Ted J. Chiappari, New USCIS Policy Clips
Entrepreneurs, Consultants and Staffing Firms, 15 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 641,
641, 644 (May 1, 2010).
'1 USCIS Holds Stakeholders Session on New H-lB Employer-Employee
Relationship Memorandum, 8 INTERP. RELEASES 438 (February 22, 2010).
197 Id
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Instead, it created a firestorm of protest, confusion 98 and at least one
lawsuit.' 99
As far as the content of the Memo, stakeholders view the
explanation of the requirements to establish an employer-employee
relationship as a major change in adjudication.200 For example, the
Memo dictates that beneficiaries who own the petitioning entity are
not eligible for H-1B status. This is seen as a major shift away from
adjudications that recognized the separate legal entity of the business
organization and found there to be an employer-employee
relationship. 201 Also, the Memo restricts, if not eliminates, third-
party placement, while stakeholders note that staffing businesses
regularly successfully petitioned for beneficiaries in the past.20 2
Stakeholders also expressed distress that the Memo was issued
without any opportunity for notice and comment.203 A lawsuit
challenging the Neufeld Memo alleged that the Memo "changed
existing law" in the absence of rulemaking. 204 The complaint alleged
that the Memo is not consistent with the regulatory requirement that
defines an employer as "a person, firm, corporation, contractor, or
other association, or organization in the United States which [h]as an
employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this
part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or
198 Although, as at least one immigration attorney has mentioned, the issuance
of the Neufeld Memo did corral into one place an explanation of what adjudicators
should consider. Gus Shihab, The January 8, 2010 Neufeld Memo, a Reason to
Panic or Breathe the Sigh of Relief? (January 25, 2010), available at
http://www.immigration-visa-lawyer-blog.com/2010/01/the-january-8-2010-
nuefeld-mem.html.
'" Broadgate v. US. Citizenship and Immigration Services, No. 10-CV-0941
(D.D.C. 2010).
200 Malcolm Goesch, An Attack on Entrepreneurialism: A Review of USCIS
Adjudication of H-1B Petitions for Startups and Small Companies in 2009, 19
INT'L H.R. J. 15 (2010).
201 Id
202 USCIS Holds Stakeholders Session on New H-1B Employer-Employee
Relationship Memorandum, supra note 196. Stakeholders emphasize that the
Memo has repercussions for the health care industry, where some states prohibit
hospitals from directly employing doctors. Id.
203 Id.
204 Broadgate v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Complaint at 2 (D.
D.C. 2010).
Spring 2011 Murky Immigration Law 85
86 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
otherwise control the work of any such employee."205 According to
the complaint, the Memo contravenes the regulation because the
regulation specifically recognizes contractors as employers, and
because the regulation defines an employer-employee relationship
("as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or
otherwise control the work of any such employee") in a different way
than the Memo.206
The District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the
Neufeld Memo complaint.207 The court concluded that the Neufeld
Memo is not a legislative rule, because it "establishes interpretive
guidelines for the implementation of the Regulation, and does not
bind USCIS adjudicators ... 208 Therefore, according to the court,
the Neufeld Memo is not final agency action and is therefore not
subject to judicial review.209
This decision is unlikely to stifle stakeholder complaints about
the Neufeld Memo, however. Even if the Neufeld Memo is a non-
binding interpretive rule, its existence and the non-transparent
process used to create it nevertheless causes confusion and frustration
within the benefits adjudication system.2 10 Either adjudicators will
effectively treat the memorandum as binding, which will cause
frustration because technically it is not binding, or adjudicators will
stray from the memorandum, causing confusion as to what exactly is
the standard for adjudication. Additionally, the USCIS Ombudsman
concluded that the issuance of such guidance may cause front-line
adjudicators to issue more Requests for Evidence, which is a further
source of frustration in the system. 2 11 A flurry of non-binding policy
205 Id. at 10 (emphasis added).206 Id. at 12.
207 Broadgate v. US. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 730 F. Supp.2d
240 (D. D.C. 2010).20 8 Id. at 246.
209 Id. at 247.
210 For example, one immigration attorney posted this response to the
government's argument that the Neufeld Memo is merely guidance: "Can you see
the milk shooting out my nose? . . . Are they really saying that Service Center
Adjudicators are free to ignore this 'contour refining guidance'? Really?" Charles
Kuck, Don't Get so Uptight. It's Only a Guideline (July 6, 2010), available at
http://www.ilw.com/articles/2010,0708-kuck.shtm.
211 U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Services
Ombudsman Annual Report 2010, supra note 96, at 43-47.
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memoranda detract from any goal of achieving the consistency in
adjudication that stakeholders crave.212
While the Neufeld Memo is an example of a controversy
surrounding the use of a guidance document in the face of an existing
regulation, the use of guidance in the absence of regulation is
exemplified by the implementation of the American Competitiveness
in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 ("AC-21"). 213  AC-21,
among other things, allows certain H-i B visa holders to extend their
stay past the normal six year cap and made H-lB visas more
portable. 2 14 No less than five USCIS policy memoranda exist on this
topic, but there are no regulations. 215  None of the agency work-
product is in the form of a notice and comment regulation, despite
continuing assurances over the past nine years from the agency that
rulemaking is in the works,216 and despite that AC-21 has produced
212 Id. at 47.
213 American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000, Pub. L.
no. 106-313, 114 Stat. 1251 (2000).
214 Id at §§ 105, 106.
215 Michael D. Cronin, Initial Guidance for Processing H-lB Petitions as
Affected by the "American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act"
(Public Law 106-313) and Related Legislation (Public Law 106-311) and (Public
Law 106-396) (June 19, 2001); William R. Yates, Continuing Validity of Form I-
140 Petition in accordance with Section 106(c) of the American Competitiveness in
the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC21) (Aug. 4, 2003); William R. Yates,
Sunset of Additional $1,000 Filing Fee Imposed by American Competitiveness and
Workforce Improvement Act (ACWIA) and Return to 65,000 Annual Limit on H-lB
Petition Approvals (Sept. 15, 2003); William R. Yates, Interim Guidance for
Processing Form 1-140 Employment-Based Immigrant Petitions and Form 1-485
and H-1B Petitions Affected by the AC21 Act (May 12, 2005); Donald Neufeld,
Supplemental Guidance Relating to Processing Forms 1-140 Employment-Based
Immigrant Petitions and 1-129 H-lB Petitions, and Form 1-485, Adjustment
Applications Affected by the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First
Century Act of 2000 (May 30, 2008). The memoranda are available by visiting
USCIS's website by clicking "Laws," then "Policy Memoranda," and then "By
Subject." These memoranda are listed under the "American Competitiveness in the
Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC2 1)" Category.
216 Michael D. Cronin, Initial Guidance for Processing H-lB Petitions as
Affected by the "American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act"
(Public Law 106-313) and Related Legislation (Public Law 106-311) and (Public
Law 106-396) (June 19, 2001) ("The following guidelines establish interim
procedures for use by Service personnel in the processing of new benefits under
AC21 and the related legislation. Forthcoming regulations will promulgate
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some tricky procedural and legal issues. 2 17  While stakeholders
appear to be more satisfied with the content of the AC-21
memoranda than the Neufeld Memo, one commentator has described
"this happy situation" as "tenuous at best, since a new memorandum
could be approved at any time that could completely change USCIS'
extra-legal, unofficial interpretation of regulation-free AC-21."218
Additionally, this commentator acknowledges that when (if ever)
USCIS issues regulations addressing AC-21, those regulations could
"disregard[ ] not only . . . AC-21 . . . memoranda, but the decade-
long history of how AC-21 has operated in this legal vacuum." 2 19
The story of the administration of the EB-5 Immigrant Investor
program is similarly full of twists in policy and a feeling among
stakeholders of shifting ground. The EB-5 story, however, also
includes a prominent role for the AAO and exemplifies how the
AAO's treatment of agency guidance causes confusion and
complications in benefits adjudication.
Congress has created a category of legal, permanent immigration
open to foreign nationals who are willing to invest in the United
States.220 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5), green cards are available
through a category known as EB-5 (Employment-Based Fifth
Preference) to those "seeking to enter the United States for the
purpose of engaging in a new commercial enterprise." 22 1 The
immigrant investor must have invested, or be in the process of
investing, one million dollars, or less (now $500,000) if the
substantive standards to be utilized in the adjudication of these new benefits.");
Donald Neufeld, Supplemental Guidance Relating to Processing Forms 1-140
Employment-Based Immigrant Petitions and 1-129 H-1B Petitions, and Form I-
485, Adjustment Applications Affected by the American Competitiveness in the
Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 at 2 n.2 (May 30, 2008) ("At a future date,
USCIS plans to incorporate all previous still applicable guidance into forthcoming
rulemaking relating to various AC21 ... statutory provisions").
217 See, e.g., H. Ronald Klasko, American Competitiveness in the 21 Century:
H-1Bs and Much More, 77 INTERP. RELEASES 1689 (Dec. 11, 2000).
218 Meyer, supra note 85, at 7.
219  d
220 There are other investor-based categories that allow for a temporary stay,
but the EB-5 program allows beneficiaries to become lawful permanent residents of
the United States.
221 8 U.S.C. § 1 153(b)(5)(A).
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investment is made in a targeted employment area.222  The
investment must also "benefit the United States economy" and create
at least 10 full-time jobs.223
USCIS' implementation of this statutory category has been
notoriously unpredictable.224 While regulations do exist, the
implementation of the statute and its regulations has been subject to
dramatically shifting interpretations. The EB-5 program remains
relatively unpopular. While most legal immigration categories face
years of pent-up demand, the EB-5 program has never exhausted its
yearly quota.225 Both the United States Government Accountability
Office (GAO) and the USCIS Ombudsman have highlighted the
roller-coaster history of the program as reasons for the category's
failure to attract applicants.226 Even USCIS itself reported to the
GAO that the uncertainty inherent in the program is likely a
contributing factor to the very limited interest in the category. 227
USCIS' implementation and adjudication of the EB-5 category is a
textbook lesson in how a lack of transparency through the use of
guidance can undermine a congressional objective.
222 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(C). A targeted employment area is "a rural area or
an area which has experienced high unemployment (of at least 150 percent of the
national average rate)." 8 U.S.C. § 1 153(b)(5)(B)(ii).
223 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A)(ii). A full time job is one "that requires at least
35 hours of service per week at any time." 8 U.S.C. § 1 153(b)(5)(D).
224 For more information on the history and development of the EB-5 program,
see Becker, supra note 172; William P. Cook, The Demand for Rulemaking: The
Sage of the EB-5 Program Continues, ALI-ABA (May 6, 1999); Leslie K.L. Thiele
and Scott T. Decker, Residence in the United States Through Investment: Reality
or Chimera?, 3 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 103 (2010).
225 The limit per year is 10,000 EB-5 visas. Immigration Law and Procedure,
supra note 57, at § 39.07. In 2009, USCIS reported that less than 1000 are used
annually. Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman,
Employment Creation Immigrant Visa (EB-5) Program Recommendations at 1
(March 18, 2009).
226 U. S. Government Accountability Office, Immigrant Investors: Small
Number of Participants Attributed to Pending Regulations and Other Factors
(April 2005); Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman,
Employment Creation Immigrant Visa (EB-5) Program Recommendations, supra
note 225, at 1.
227 Immigrant Investors: Small Number of Participants Attributed to
Regulations and Other Factors, supra note 226, at 9.
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As the USCIS Ombudsman has noted, uncertainty has
"[p]lagued" the immigrant investor program "since inception."2 28
The EB-5 program can be divided into three phases: birth, near-
death, and then a potential resuscitation.
Congress created the EB-5 category in 1990. From 1990 until
late 1997, the program endured some growing pains as the agency
developed regulations and issued guidance. But the agency was
forming a foundation for how the program would function on the
ground. During this period, the agency defined statutory terms and
elaborated on details, and the program functioned without any major
shifts in agency interpretation. 229 In fact, some signs pointed to the
development of a more generous program. For example, in 1992,
Congress added a pilot program to open up the EB-5 category to
those invested in a Regional Center.23o Those invested in a Regional
Center could count indirect job creation toward their job creation
requirement. 231
A seismic shift developed from late 1997 through 1998. A
dramatic and opaque shift in agency adjudication stifled the growth
of the program. Concerns about fraud led the agency to reconsider
its founding implementation of the program.232 in November 1997,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") (the predecessor
to USCIS), placed a hold on the adjudication of certain EB-5
petitions.233 The General Counsel of INS issued an opinion the
228 Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman,
Employment Creation Immigrant Visa (EB-5) Program Recommendations, supra
note 225, at 7.
229 The now defunct Immigration and Naturalization Service issued regulations
implementing the new EB-5 program throughout the early 1990s. These
regulations addressed such issues as defining "capital" and determining what
counts as "a new commercial enterprise." See Employment-Based Immigrants, 56
Fed. Reg. 60897 (Nov. 29, 1991); Immigrant Investor Pilot Program, 58 Fed. Reg.
44606 (Aug. 24, 1993); Immigrant Investor Pilot Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 17921
(April 15, 1994).
230 Pub. L. no. 102-395, 106 Stat. 1828, 1874 (1992).
231 Id
232 Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman,
Employment Creation Immigrant Visa (EB-5) Program Recommendations, supra
note 225, at 7-8.
233 Cook, supra note 224, at 1-2. In December 2007, the Department of State
decided to suspend processing of these types of EB-5 cases. Id.
following month explaining that "[o]ver the last several years, a
number of serious issues have arisen regarding the legality of certain
types of business arrangements" contained in EB-5 petitions. 234 The
General Counsel reviewed these types of business arrangements and
found them not to qualify under the EB-5 statute and regulations.235
The suspect arrangements all raised questions about whether the
foreign national's investment was truly at risk, and included: the use
of promissory notes as investment vehicles; the use of installment
plans as a means of making an investment; the use of an option given
to sell or buy the investment at a fixed price; and the use of
guaranteed returns. 236
After the issuance of the General Counsel's legal opinion, INS
continued to pause adjudication of EB-5 cases that contained these
types of business arrangements. 237  INS next ordered its first tier
adjudicators to select four EB-5 petitions containing these types of
business arrangements, to immediately remove the hold and to
adjudicate those four petitions.2 38  INS instructed those first-tier
adjudicators to then forward to the AAO the newly adjudicated
petitions.239
After the hold, the AAO adjudicated the four cases selected by
INS for AAO adjudication and issued four precedent decisions from
late June through July of 1998.240 According to the USCIS
Ombudsman, these decisions "altered the previously issued guidance
and substituted new and more restrictive interpretations of the
law." 241 For example, before the 1997-98 changes to the program,
234 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of General Counsel,
Memorandum to Paul W. Virtue, Acting Executive Associate Commissioner,
Office of Programs (Dec. 19. 1997), available at
http://shusterman.com/eb5investorsinsmemol998.html.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Cook, supra note 224, at 4-5.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 In re Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158 (June 30, 1998); In re Izummi, 22 I&N Dec.
169 (July 13, 1998); In re Hsiung, 22 I&N Dec. 201 (July 31, 1998); In re Ho, 22
I&N Dec. 206 (July 31, 1998).
241 Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman,
Employment Creation Immigrant Visa (EB-5) Program Recommendations, supra
note 225, at 8.
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both redemption provisions and guaranteed returns were permissible,
but not after.242 Also, before the changes, promissory notes were
much more widely used as part of an investment.243 The cherry-
picked precedent decisions the AAO issued during the summer of
1998 made the EB-5 program harder to access, but also shifted the
ground under those who were in the process of making, or had
already made, investments that were once acceptable, but now were
not.
The shift in adjudication was met with a steep drop in the number
of filed EB-5 petitions.24 But the change in standards did more than
discourage new applicants. INS decided to apply the precedent
decisions retroactively, and to remove (deport) some whose EB-5
petitions had been approved under the old standards.245 Others were
placed in a strange legal limbo. Congress established the EB-5
program to first grant conditional green cards to investors.24 6 Those
conditions would need to be removed after two years, thus building
in a second look to make sure the investor followed through on his or
her commitments. 247 Those who held conditional green cards at the
time of the AAO precedent decisions faced the real probability,
especially given INS' decision to retroactively apply the decisions,
that the conditions on their green card would never be removed.248
The change in standards injected intense uncertainty into the EB-
5 program, and also bluntly angered stakeholders. As one
commentator wrote in 1999:
Essentially instead of presenting clear guidelines,
the AAO opted to dispose of seven (7) years of
established EB-5 precedent in favor of a complete
reversal of accepted practice and blithely disavowed
dozens of the Service's own pronouncements about
practices it long held acceptable in the EB-5 Program.
2421d
243 id
244 d
245 Id. at 9-10.
2461d
247 1d
2481d
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And worse, the Service laid down the gauntlet that it
fully intended to apply these new rules retroactively to
cases long since approved, even to those cases where
visas had been issued without [the immigration
agency's] objection.249
The change in standards, combined with the retroactive
applications of those standards, sent a signal to current and potential
investors that the decisions of the agency could not be relied upon,
and that the law could change without notice.
The EB-5 category lay dormant from the 1997-98 period of
change until a recent rebirth of interest in the EB-5 program after a
series of congressional amendments to the program. In 2000, 2002
and 2003, Congress broadened the permissible business activities of
an EB-5 investment and clarified aspects of the program.250
The EB-5 program still has its problems, however. For example,
the 2002 amendments also aimed to bring relief to those EB-5
investors stuck in the legal limbo created by the change in standards
in conjunction with their conditional green card status.25' USCIS has
been slow to close this chapter, however, as by 2009 it was still
drafting regulations that would implement Congress' directive. 252
In this EB-5 scenario, the AAO overturned existing guidance of
agency officials through precedent opinions. Those opinions did
provide firmer ground, but did so by injecting a lack of confidence in
the system. The precedent decisions overturned existing practices,
and applied the new standards retroactively. Also, the procedure
used to issue the precedent decisions left room to infer that the rest of
USCIS and the AAO worked together to achieve a pre-ordained
result.
This discussion about guidance reveals that USCIS' use of
guidance in benefits adjudication makes the system opaque, and
249 Cook, supra note 224, at 11. Another commentator called the changes
"unexpected and drastic." Becker, supra note 172, at 220.
250 Brandon Meyer and Karen Caco, Spreading Like Wildfire! What Explains
the Explosive Growth ofEB-5 Regional Centers? IMMIGR. BRIEFRNGS (Feb. 2010).
251 Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman,
Employment Creation Immigrant Visa (EB-5) Program Recommendations, supra
note 225, at 10.
252 Id.
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recognition of the lack of transparency leads to an understanding of
the frustration shared by stakeholders about the system. The stories
of the Neufeld Memo, AC-21 and EB-5 provide context to
stakeholder complaints about unpredictability, uncertainty and
unreliability. The Neufeld Memo shows the confusion and lack of
confidence that can develop when an agency chooses guidance over
rulemaking, and when an agency changes course through guidance.
AC-21 is an example of a total absence of standards that hold the
force of law, while the story of the EB-5 category shows how the
AAO's treatment of agency guidance can contribute to confusion and
a lack of confidence.
When USCIS governs by memorandum, there is no firm ground.
Any ground that a memo provides is never firm, especially because
USCIS has exhibited a willingness to change course dramatically.
Stakeholders lack clear direction as to even how the agency itself will
treat such memos, and an absence of notice and comment regulations
leaves them to rely on memoranda. It is not surprising that
stakeholders complain about an uncertainty of what legal standards
will apply.
But the problems with benefits adjudication do not end with the
use of guidance. Benefits adjudication is also not transparent due to
the obscurity of the AAO. As described above, the AAO's obscurity
is tied to its bureaucratic placement and to its operating practices.
The AAO is buried within USCIS. Its place in the immigration
bureaucracy is far less prominent than that of the Board of
Immigration Appeals, for example. The Board, while lacking
decisional independence, at least exists outside of the Department of
Homeland Security. The Board is placed within the Department of
Justice, which is still a law enforcement agency, but at least is a
different agency than the agency charged with enforcing immigration
law. 253 Also, the AAO exists within USCIS in a non-exalted place.
The AAO appears to reside at the same level of the bureaucracy as
Service Center Operations, and the AAO is tasked with reviewing the
253 The Board of Immigration Appeals is a part of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, which is a part of the Department of Justice. U.S. Dep't. of
Justice, Executive Office for Immigr. Review, About the Office, available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm.
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work product of those service centers. 254 Also, the AAO adjudicators
themselves lack status, as they are not Administrative Law Judges, 255
and they may not even issue a precedent decision without outside
approval.
The AAO's operating practices are also obscure. The internal
workings of the AAO are a mystery, even to seasoned immigration
law practitioners. The jurisdiction of the AAO is hard to discern, and
its internal operating procedures are revealed only through sources
that are obscure themselves, such as notes of meetings with
stakeholders or through an ombudsman's report. As explained
above, the AAO will not even share information on its workload
data. Researching the AAO can feel like investigating a super secret
organization, picking up bits and pieces of information from
decentralized sources. 256 This is especially surprising given the size
of the AAO's caseload of between 14,000 to 15,000 appeals per year,
and given that its work is not extraordinary or especially sensitive.
Even the AAO's output is obscure. Its decisions are hard to locate
and are subject to an overly complicated system that produces
adopted decisions in lieu of full precedential decisions. Again, the
AAO did not issue a precedential decision from 1998 until late 2010,
when it issued two.
If no precedential decisions are issued, then there is little to bind
adjudicators, whether front-line or AAO, and there is little concrete
information for use by petitioners and their counsel.2 57 The lack of
precedent also reflects on the perceived independence of the AAO.
Without rules in place, the AAO appears to function as a policy arm
254 For further discussion on the differences between the Board and the AAO,
see Legomsky, Forum Choices, supra note 82, at 1317-19.
255 See supra note 22.
256 In fact, some policy memoranda related to the AAO's operations appear to
be impossible to locate unless one is a paying member of the American
Immigration Lawyers Association. Brent Johnson, a Widener University School of
Law librarian, had tremendously difficulty locating several agency memoranda
pertaining to the AAO.
257 To further complicate matters, the AAO has declined to follow a
memorandum bearing the "P" policy label. Schorr, supra note 139, at 1394-95.
The AAO did so, however, through an unpublished decision, which, according the
Adjudicator's Field Manual, is not binding. Adjudicator's Field Manual, supra
note 89, at § 3.4(a).
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of USCIS rather than as an independent adjudicator. 258 The precedent
process itself contributes to the AAO's reputation. After all, the
AAO may not even issue a precedent decision without the approval
of USCIS and other agency components.
Both the use of guidance and the obscurity of the AAO illustrate
the lack of transparency in immigration law when it comes to
benefits adjudication. This infusion of opacity contributes to
stakeholder complaints about the benefits adjudication system. By
relying on shifting standards for so many fundamental issues and by
allowing its appellate adjudication function to operate under such a
cloud of mystery, USCIS has created an atmosphere of
unpredictability and unreliability that harms the practice of
immigration law, as well as the reputation of a government agency
charged with making life-changing decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are major problems affecting both removal and benefits
immigration adjudication. Immigration adjudicators hearing removal
cases lack decisional independence, and make up a low-respected
system that pushes its adjudicators to rush through cases that actually
require a great deal of time and attention, while the great majority of
foreign nationals appearing before these adjudicators lack quality
legal representation. The benefits adjudication system is plagued by
a reputation of a system that causes much confusion and frustration,
and is also unreliable.
This article explores a connection between the crises in removal
and benefits adjudication. The opacity of immigration law presents
challenges to both removal and benefits adjudication. This
connection suggests that the lack of transparency in immigration law
is a broad and deep problem.
In the removal context, the lack of transparency is exemplified by
the law's complexity and its use of negative discretion. The
258 See Leon Wildes, Review of Key Decisions of the Administrative Appeals
Units, Practising Law Institute at 51-52 (October 1, 1987); but see USCIS
Administrative Appeals Office Stakeholder Engagement, supra note 105, at 2
("While the AAO has a long history of discussing legal and policy issues with other
USCIS entities, it does not seek their input prior to reaching a decision in an
individual case.").
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complexity of the law sets up a mismatch of a low volume law
uncomfortably jammed into a high volume removal adjudication
system. The complexity of the law and the use of negative discretion
make it difficult to litigate removal cases without dedicating one's
practice to such cases, which may discourage legal representation,
while the lack of lawyers in the removal system, in combination with
the complexity of the law, highlights the problem presented by a lack
of decisional independence for removal adjudicators. All of the
above understandably contribute to a negative mystique about
immigration law.
In the benefits context, the lack of transparency is exemplified by
the agency's use of administrative guidance materials and by the
obscurity of the agency's Administrative Appeals Office. An
atmosphere of confusion, unpredictability, and unreliability pervades
benefits adjudication. The roots of this atmosphere may be found in
agency practices where adjudicatory standards sharply shift without
warning, where too few legal regulatory rules exist, and where the
role and duties of the administrative appellate body are shrouded in
mystery.
Examining the crises in removal and benefits adjudication makes
plain a great need for reform. This article reveals links between
murky immigration law and both the removal and benefits
adjudication systems. These links must be considered in crafting any
reform.
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